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  A growing number of studies are using a dichotomous variable indicating the presence of a 
standalone CSR report to capture impacts of CSR disclosure.  Our concern is that, without 
considering differences in the information provided, such an approach could lead to incorrect 
inferences regarding those impacts.  Accordingly, we extend prior research by examining whether, 
similar to differences in environmental disclosure, the mere presence of a standalone CSR report 
also mitigates negative market reactions at times of regulatory cost exposure. We focus on the 
2011 Fukushima Daiichi disaster and a sample of international utilities with nuclear power 
generation.  Controlling for other factors related to social and regulatory cost exposures, we find 
only the environmental disclosures appear to reduce negative market effects.  We thus argue that, 
in exploring the impacts of CSR disclosure, researchers need to carefully consider, beyond just the 




























Measuring CSR Disclosure when Assessing Stock Market Effects 
Introduction 
 Over the past decade, a growing body of research explores the impacts of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) disclosure based on the existence of a standalone CSR report.  These 
studies include examinations of CSR disclosure’s impact on cost of capital (Dhaliwal et al. 2011; 
2014), future earnings response coefficients (Dhaliwal et al. 2012; Birkey et al. 2017), aspects of 
firm reputation (Axjonow et al. 2018; Clarkson et al. 2020), and CSR ratings (Mahoney et al. 
2013), among other items.  Of particular interest to our study, three recent investigations 
(Christensen 2016; Du and Wu 2019; Li et al. 2017) examine whether the presence of a CSR 
report reduces negative market reactions to events triggering potential increases in regulatory 
cost concerns, and their results lack a consistent pattern. For example, Christensen (2016) 
focuses on high profile misconduct by U.S. firms and finds that CSR reports reduce negative 
market reactions to announcements of the events.  In contrast, Du and Wu (2019), examining 
similar events in Taiwan, find that CSR reports similarly reduce negative market reactions, but 
only for sub-groups of firms with first-time offenses and events of an environmental nature.  
From a slightly different perspective, Li et al. (2017) focus on the early December 2013 haze 
crisis in China and find that CSR report issuance appeared to mitigate market concerns on the 
day the air quality index first moved into the ‘hazardous’ range, but was negatively related to 
market reactions for the subsequent period of high media coverage of the crisis. 
 One possible explanation for the somewhat inconsistent findings reported by Christensen 
(2016), Du and Wu (2019), and Li et al. (2017) is that none of the studies considers differences 
in the extent of information provided in the reports or through other means.  This is important 
because numerous studies in the sustainability accounting domain (e.g., Cho et al. 2012b; Patten 
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and Zhao 2014; Parsa et al. 2018) document considerable differences in the extent of social and 
environmental information provided in CSR reports.  Further, investors appear to value those 
differences.  For example, both Guidry and Patten (2010), examining U.S. firms, and Wang and 
Li (2016), focusing on Chinese companies, report significantly more positive market reactions to 
first-time issuance of CSR reports of higher quality versus those with less extensive disclosure. 
Additionally, prior studies of environmental catastrophic events show more extensive 
environmental disclosures appeared to lead to less negative market reactions for intra-industry 
firms (Blacconiere and Patten 1994; Patten and Nance 1998; Heflin and Wallace 2017).1  As 
such, our concern is that the failure to include assessments of differences in disclosure may lead 
to incorrect inferences about the effects of CSR disclosure, both with respect to the use of CSR 
reports, and more generally. 
To shed light on this issue, we examine whether CSR disclosure, either as the existence 
of prior CSR reports or as the extent of firms’ overall environmental disclosure, impacts market 
reactions to another catastrophic event raising regulatory cost concerns, the 2011 Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear disaster.  A major earthquake and tsunami on 11 March 2011 led to explosions 
and a partial nuclear meltdown at Tokyo Electric Power’s (TEPCO) Fukushima nuclear power 
plant in Northeast Japan.  Within days of the incident, more than 200,000 people had to be 
evacuated from the region due to concerns with radiation leakage, and the event triggered 
renewed questions on the safety of nuclear power generation (Hayashi and Hughes 2013; Vivoda 
and Graetz 2015).  Early studies of the market impact of the disaster (e.g., Ferstl et al. 2012; 
Kawashima and Takeda 2012; Betzer et al. 2013) document significant negative reactions for 
 
1 Blacconiere and Patten (1984), Patten and Nance (1998), and Heflin and Wallace (2017) explore the market 
reaction to the 1984 Union Carbide chemical leak in Bhopal, India, the 1989 Alaskan oil spill, and the 2010 BP 
Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, respectively. 
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Japanese, French, and German utility companies with nuclear operations, but none explores the 
role that CSR disclosure may have played in these reactions.2    
 Based on a sample of 52 utilities with nuclear power generation representing 16 different 
countries,3 we first document a significant negative market reaction of 2.24 percent over the 
three-day period commencing with the Fukushima accident for our sample.  This aligns with the 
prior studies of market reactions to the event and indicates investor concern, presumably due to 
potential regulatory impacts.  In cross sectional analysis of the market reactions controlling for 
other factors likely impacting perceptions of regulatory cost exposures, we find that the presence 
of a standalone CSR report prior to the disaster is not significantly related to differences in 
investor response.  In contrast, and consistent with the prior studies of catastrophic 
environmental events, higher levels of pre-event environmental disclosure appeared to mitigate 
the extent of negative reactions.  Further analysis shows these findings are robust to a variety of 
additional controls.   
 Our results highlight a potential problem with using CSR report issuance as a measure of 
CSR disclosure.  Without further analysis of the impact related to differences in environmental 
disclosure across firms, our findings would suggest that CSR reporting did not influence investor 
reactions to the Fukushima Daiichi event for our sample of firms.  But the more specific focus on 
differences in environmental disclosure results in different conclusions.  As such, we believe our 
analysis highlights the importance, when examining the impacts of CSR disclosure, to carefully 
assess differences in the specific aspects of the information being provided.   
We begin with background on the motivation for our investigation. 
 
 
2 Bonetti et al. (2018) do consider the role of carbon emission disclosure in market reactions to the Fukushima event, 
but their focus is on a broad set of Japanese firms that is not restricted to utilities. 
3 We exclude TEPCO from the analysis.  
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Background and Development of Hypotheses 
 
Motivation for Our Study 
 
 Academic inquiry into market valuation of CSR disclosure dates back more than 40 years 
(see, e.g., Belkaoui 1976; Ingram 1978; Anderson and Frankle 1980), and one subset of this 
research focuses more specifically on whether CSR disclosure reduces investor concerns at times 
of increased regulatory cost exposures.  Watts and Zimmerman (1986) identify the potential 
issues firms face with respect to political costs, and proponents of legitimacy theory (e.g., 
Warsame et al. 2002; Cho et al. 2015; Patten 2020) argue that companies use CSR disclosure to 
reduce these threats.  As such, if investors perceive more extensive disclosure as a signal of 
firms’ reduced exposure to the political process, market reactions for firms providing more 
extensive disclosure should be less negative at times of increased regulatory cost concerns 
(Blacconiere and Patten 1994).  
Investigations of the market reaction to the Three Mile Island nuclear disaster (Bowen et 
al. 1983; Hill and Schneeweis 1983) and the 1982 Tylenol tampering incident (Dowdell et al. 
1992) provide early evidence of investor concern with regulatory cost exposures, but none of 
these studies explores the potential mitigating impact of CSR disclosure for affected firms.  The 
first study to consider this issue, Blacconiere and Patten (1994), examines the market reaction for 
U.S. chemical firms other than Union Carbide in response to that company’s 1984 chemical leak 
at its Bhopal, India processing plant.  They report a significant negative market reaction, on 
average, and they further find the impacts are negatively related to companies’ involvement in 
chemical operations.  However, Blacconiere and Patten also show that the market reactions are 
positively related to levels of prior environmental disclosure (companies with higher levels of 
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disclosure suffered less negative market reactions), and they attribute this to investors perceiving 
the disclosure as reducing exposures to the social and political process. 
Patten and Nance (1998) similarly investigate whether prior levels of environmental 
disclosure appeared to mitigate investor concerns with potential regulatory costs arising from the 
1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill off the coast of Alaska.  Although, on average, their sample of 25 
U.S. petroleum firms (Exxon was excluded) exhibited positive market reactions in the period 
immediately following the disaster,4 Patten and Nance document regulatory cost concerns in that 
firm size and having operations in Alaska were both negatively related to market impacts.  
Consistent with Blacconiere and Patten (1994), Patten and Nance also find that more extensive 
levels of prior environmental disclosure were positively related to market reactions. 
More recently, Heflin and Wallace (2017) explore market effects related to BP’s 2010 
Deepwater Horizon platform explosion and subsequent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.  Also 
focusing on U.S. oil and gas firms, they report significant negative intra-industry market 
reactions, but only for a sub-sample of companies with offshore oil exploration activities.  Heflin 
and Wallace also find that higher levels of pre-event environmental disclosure reduced the 
severity of negative market reactions, but again only for firms with offshore exploration.  
Consistent with Blacconiere and Patten (1994) and Patten and Nance (1998), they argue 
investors perceive the disclosure as reducing exposures to social and political costs. 
 In sum, Blacconiere and Patten (1994), Patten and Nance (1998), and Heflin and Wallace 
(2017) all document that it is differences in the extent of disclosure that appear to mitigate 
investor concerns at times of catastrophic events that potentially increase companies’ exposure to 
 
4 Patten and Nance (1998) attribute the positive reactions to substantial increases in oil and gas prices in response to 
the threat of reduced petroleum supplies in the U.S.  
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social and regulatory costs.5  However, three recent studies (Christensen 2016; Li et al. 2017: Du 
and Wu 2019) explore the potential impacts of CSR disclosure at times of regulatory cost 
exposure focusing on the mere presence of a CSR report.   
 Building on a pair of prior studies focusing on financial impacts of the presence of a 
standalone CSR report (Dhaliwal et al. 2011; 2012), Christensen (2016) explores the relation 
between the reporting practice and incidents of high-profile misconduct, including those of an 
environmental nature.  Christensen (2016, 378) proxies high-profile misconduct as “lawsuits 
related to CSR issues (e.g., bribery, kickbacks, discrimination) that appear in reputable 
international press articles.”  He identifies (385) that about six percent of his 749 sample 
observations relate to environmental events.  Noting that executives often cite a “desire to 
protect the firm’s brands and reputation” (Christensen 2016, 377, his emphasis) as the purpose 
for the reporting, Christensen documents less negative market reactions to high profile 
misconduct for firms having issued a standalone CSR report.  Christensen’s (2016, 380) 
argument, or at least his evidence, seems to be that merely issuing a standalone CSR report is 
sufficient to generate “insurance-like protection that helps reduce negative consequences when 
bad events occur.” 
 Du and Wu (2019) build on Christensen (2016) and examine market reactions to CSR-
related misconduct events in Taiwan.  In addition to testing impacts of the presence of a CSR 
 
5 Aside from catastrophic events, both Blacconiere and Northcut (1997) and Freedman and Patten (2004) also 
examine the role of environmental disclosures in mitigating market reactions to environmental legislation events and 
both document that differences in the extent of disclosure appear to mitigate negative market reactions.  And, while 
not examining market use of the information, other studies similarly find impacts related to differences in overall 
environmental information disclosure.  For example, Toms et al. (2005), focusing on a sample of UK firms, 
document that differences in both the quantity and the quality of environmental disclosure explain differences in 
environmental reputation.  Similarly, Cho et al. (2012a) find that more extensive environmental disclosure is 
significantly associated with membership in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index as well as perceptions of 





report, they also explore whether assurance on the report makes a difference.  Focusing on a 
sample of 1,531 events, nearly half of which (47.81%) are related to environmental protection 
and safety issues, they find that neither factor is significantly associated with differences in 
market returns.  However, in additional analyses they document that both factors become 
significant if it is a first-time offense, and, that for events of an environmental nature, the 
existence of a CSR report, with or without assurance, reduces negative market reactions. 
 More closely aligned to the prior studies of catastrophic events, Li et al. (2017) examine 
the market reaction to the 2013 ‘haze crisis’ in China.  On December 2 of that year, the country’s 
air quality index moved into the hazardous zone for the first time ever, triggering production and 
other work stoppages and leading to substantial media coverage.  Li et al. document that market 
reactions on the initial event day were less negative for companies having previously issued CSR 
reports.  However, report issuance was negatively associated with market reactions over the days 
of increased media coverage of the crisis (trading days three through eight). 
   Overall, the results from Christensen (2016), Du and Wu (2019), and Li et al. (2017) do 
not provide consistent evidence that the mere existence of CSR reports serve to mitigate investor 
concerns at times of increased regulatory exposure.  We believe the problem is that a 
dichotomous reporting variable fails to capture differences in the extent of information being 
provided, and this is important because, as documented in prior studies, such differences can be 
vast.  To illustrate, Guidry and Patten (2010) analyze 37 first-time standalone CSR reports using 
a 55-item disclosure scale based on Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines.  Following 
Wiseman’s (1982) weighting for differences in quantitative, specific, and general disclosures, 
they report scores ranging from a low of five points to a high of 74.  Guidry and Patten also 
document substantial differences in the number of companies providing specific types of CSR 
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information.  For example, while 31 of the sample reports included information on diversity or 
non-discrimination programs, only one disclosed indirect energy consumption, and there were 
numerous disclosure items recommended by the GRI not included in any of the reports.  Similar 
variations in the extent of disclosure included in standalone CSR reports have been documented 
in a variety of other studies (e.g., Cho et al. 2012a, Habek and Wolniak 2016, and Odriozola and 
Baraibar-Diez 2017, among others).  Importantly, Guidry and Patten (2010) document that 
investors appear to value the differences in disclosure as they show that market reactions to 
announcements of report issuance were significantly more positive for companies with more 
extensive disclosure versus those issuing lower quality reports.  Wang and Li (2016) report 
similar findings for their sample of first-time CSR report issuing firms in China. 
We believe that the substantial differences in the extent of information provided in CSR 
reports, in conjunction with the evidence from Blacconiere and Patten (1994), Patten and Nance 
(1998), and Heflin and Wallace (2017) that it is more extensive information provision that 
appears to drive market reactions at times of environmental disasters, calls into question whether 
reliance on a dichotomous reporting variable can adequately identify the value of CSR disclosure 
at times of regulatory cost-inducing events.  However, we concede that, while Christensen 
(2016), Du and Wu (2019), and Li et al. (2017) do not include assessments of the extensiveness 
of disclosure, none of the environmental disaster studies explores whether the existence of CSR 
reports might similarly explain reduced negative market reactions.  Accordingly, we extend both 
of these streams of research and examine whether the existence of a CSR report and the extent of 
environmental disclosure similarly explain differences in investor response to catastrophic events 
that likely increase the social and political exposure of firms in the affected industry.  We test 
these issues relative to the market reactions to the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster.   
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The Fukushima Event 
An earthquake off North Japan’s coast at approximately 2:46pm (JST) on 11 March 2011 
led the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant to automatically shut down. The tsunami that 
resulted from the earthquake struck the plant about an hour later, causing a failure in the backup 
cooling system on the same day and a series of fires and explosions in the ensuing days.  Further, 
radiation levels around the site and in the bordering seawater rose above the norm, resulting in 
the evacuation of local residents within a radius of 30 kilometres.  Those living nearest the plant 
were allowed to return only recently.  Soon after the incident, news broke of a possible partial 
meltdown in the plant. This was later confirmed by the Japanese government, as well as by 
TEPCO, the operator of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The disaster was classed as 
a level 7 event on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale6 (INES) (major 
accident), which is the highest level on the index, putting it on par with the Chernobyl disaster in 
1986. Figure 1 presents a timeline of events over the first five days (three trading days) of the 
disaster. The catastrophe represented a threat to the legitimacy of the nuclear industry 
worldwide, as the event made the dangers and risks inherent in the technology apparent (see, 
e.g., Hayashi and Hughes 2013; Vivoda and Graetz 2015).  
---------- Figure 1 about here ---------- 
 Several studies already investigate the market reaction following the Fukushima disaster, 
examining the share price movements for utilities in different geographic contexts and for 
different utility sub-sectors.7  
 
6 See https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/ines.pdf  
 
7 Bonetti et al. (2018), as part of their analysis of the impact of the Fukushima event on the cost of capital for 
Japanese firms (not restricted to utilities), also examine market reactions.  They find a negative response, in general, 
but find it is less pronounced for those Japanese firms disclosing carbon emission information prior to the disaster. 
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Focusing specifically on Japanese utilities, Kawashima and Takeda (2012) investigate the 
market reaction for 11 companies excluding TEPCO. They divide the sample according to 
whether companies were directly affected by the earthquake and tsunami (Tohoku Electric 
Power was the only other company affected in the sample), whether they own nuclear power 
plants, and whether they are larger nuclear utilities (≥ 20 percent of total power generation is 
nuclear), as well as according to the age of nuclear power plants, and reactor design. Using daily 
returns, they report a significant negative market reaction for all Japanese utility companies over 
a three-day event period, as well as over longer event windows of 31 and 138 days. The reaction 
was more pronounced for Tohoku Electric Power, the only other utility directly struck by the 
earthquake and the tsunami, and for those utilities with nuclear power plants.8  
 Both Ferstl et al. (2012) and Betzer et al. (2013) investigate the market reaction to the 
Fukushima disaster using international samples of utility companies. Ferstl et al. examine the 
market reaction of French, German, Japanese and U.S. utility firms and compare the reactions for 
nuclear utilities (≥ 1,000 megawatt of installed nuclear capacity) and alternative energy 
companies. Using daily returns and Fama-French’s three-factor model, they find a significant 
negative share price reaction for Japanese, German, and French nuclear utilities over a five-day 
event period (14-18 March 2011). Japanese, German, and French alternative energy companies, 
on the other hand, experienced positive market reactions over the event window. The market 
reactions of U.S. utilities were insignificant for both sub-samples. Consistent with Kawashima 
and Takeda (2012), Ferstl et al. report that Japanese nuclear utilities suffered a prolonged and 
significant negative market reaction over a five week period following the event.  They conclude 
that investors in Japanese nuclear utility companies appeared to be uncertain about future 
 
8 We delete Tohoku Electric Power from our analysis as its three-day CAR falls more than three standard deviations 
from the overall sample mean (see discussion below). 
11 
  
regulatory changes, while investors in French and German nuclear firms appeared to anticipate a 
shift towards the use of alternative energy generation. They argue that in the U.S., on the other 
hand, no regulatory changes of energy policies were expected, explaining their differing results. 
The findings suggest that investor perceptions are influenced by the regulatory environment and 
anticipated changes thereof following environmental disasters.  
Similar to Ferstl et al. (2012), Betzer et al. (2013) examine the post-Fukushima market 
reaction for a sample of 38 German and 38 European utilities and compare these for nuclear and 
conventional utilities in comparison to renewable energy companies. They find no significant 
market reactions on the day of the Fukushima disaster for German or European nuclear and 
conventional utilities. On Monday, 14 March 2011, however, German nuclear and conventional 
utilities suffered significantly negative abnormal returns of -3.27 percent, while their European 
counterparts did not experience a significant market reaction. German renewable energy 
companies, on the other hand, experienced significantly positive abnormal returns of 11.07 
percent on that day. The authors explain the negative market reaction for German nuclear and 
conventional utilities on 14 March 2011 as being due to the German government announcing an 
immediate and final shutdown of their oldest nuclear reactors and a 3-month moratorium for all 
other reactors for the purpose of safety inspections. In contrast, their European counterparts did 
not face any immediate policy changes. Betzer et al. conclude that market reactions depend more 
strongly on anticipated policy changes and potential regulatory costs than on the environmental 
disaster itself. 
Hypotheses 
None of the prior studies of market reactions to the Fukushima disaster examines whether 
differences in CSR disclosure, either through the existence of a CSR report or differences in the 
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extent of environmental information being provided, potentially impacted investor reactions for 
utility companies facing increased regulatory exposures related to nuclear power generation.  
Accordingly, we use this event to explore whether the alternate CSR reporting measures 
similarly impact market reactions to the disaster.  Although argued to potentially reduce investor 
concerns, the evidence on CSR report impacts across Christensen (2016), Du and Wu (2019), 
and Li et al. (2017) yield, at best, mixed evidence of such an effect.  We thus offer our 
hypothesis regarding the presence of CSR reports on the market reaction to the Fukushima event 
in null form: 
H1: The market reaction to the Fukushima nuclear disaster will not be related 
to the existence of a CSR report in the period prior to the event. 
 In contrast, based on the consistent evidence from Blacconiere and Patten (1994), Patten 
and Nance (1998), and Heflin and Wallace (2017) regarding differences in environmental 
disclosure and investor reactions to catastrophic events, we expect differences in the extent of 
environmental disclosure similarly to mitigate the market reactions to the Fukushima disaster.  
As such, we state our second hypothesis (in directional form) as: 
H2: The market reaction to the Fukushima nuclear disaster will be positively related 





 Our sample differs from those used in the prior investigations of the market reaction to 
the Fukushima event in that we include utilities from across the globe and we focus exclusively 
on companies with nuclear power generation.9  To be included in the sample, companies had to: 
 
9 Studies of the market reaction to earlier nuclear disasters at Three Mile Island in the U.S. (Bowen et al. 1983; Hill 
and Schneeweis 1983) and Chernobyl in the U.S.S.R. (Fields and Janjigian 1989; Kalra et al. 1993) indicate the 
disasters appear only to have impacted utilities with nuclear power generation, suggesting it is these firms that face 
increased regulatory cost exposure arising from such an event.  To assure this holds in our setting, we identified a 
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(1) be a publicly traded utility (other than TEPCO) with market price data available on the 
Thomson One Banker database, 
 
(2) have information on power generation available on their website or in company or other 
reports indicating the company had nuclear power generation at the time of the 
Fukushima event,10  
 
(3) not have confounding financial news announcements in the period of investigation, and  
 
(4) have CSR disclosure data for 2010 on the Bloomberg database. 
 
In total, we identified 53 firms meeting these criteria.  However, examination of the abnormal 
returns over the event period (discussed below) revealed one company with abnormal returns 
falling more than three standard deviations from the mean.11  We deleted this outlier observation, 
leaving a sample of 52 firms.  The companies represent 16 different countries, with the highest 
representation (26 firms) coming from the U.S.  The sample also includes seven Japanese 
utilities. Table 1 identifies the sample distribution by country location. 
---------- Table 1 about here ---------- 
Dependent Variable – 3-day CARs  
 
 The earthquake and resulting tsunami leading to the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power plant were unanticipated events, and as such, we expect share price movements to 
occur on the day of the accident and thereafter.  Therefore, we designate 11 March 2011 as event 
day 0, and consistent with Kawashima and Takeda (2012), we calculate the market reaction over 
a three trading-day window (day 0 through day +2, inclusive).12  Hillman et al. (1999, 73) note 
 
sample of 260 international utilities without nuclear power generation and calculated three-day cumulative abnormal 
returns as described below.  The mean reaction for this group was a minus 0.45 percent and it was not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. 
10 We hand collected data on power generation by source from company websites, financial reports, and standalone 
sustainability reports.  If we could not definitively identify the breakdown of power generation sources, companies 
were excluded from the sample. 
11 The outlier company, Tohuku Electric Power of Japan, had been identified by Kawashima and Takeda (2012) as 
also impacted by the tsunami. 
12 Christensen (2016) and Du and Wu (2019) similarly use three-day CARs.  However, there is variation in the 
windows used in the studies of catastrophic events.  Both Kawashima and Takeda (2012) and Fields and Janjigian 
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that the use of a short event window allows researchers “to attribute any abnormal return to the 
event of interest as it minimizes the potential for confounding events during the same window 
that may affect firm performance.” 
 We use standard market model methods (see, e.g., Brown and Warner, 1985) to isolate 
the abnormal market reaction.  Based on a 100-day pre-event period (days -110 to -11), we 
estimate market parameters using the basic market model: 
(1) Rjt = a1 +BiRmt + ejt 
where Rmt represents the stock index average on which the sample company’s shares are 
primarily listed.  We then calculate daily abnormal returns as: 
(2)  ARjt = Rjt – E(Rjt) 
where E(Rjt) is based on each company’s market parameters and relevant stock index average 
return for each day of the test period.  Finally, we cumulate the abnormal returns over the three-
day period and calculate significance adjusting for potential clustering effects (see Edwards and 
Shevlin, 2011). 
CSR Reporting Measures 
We separately include two distinct CSR reporting metrics, one identifying the existence 
of standalone CSR reports (as in Christensen 2016, Li et al. 2017, and Du and Wu 2019), and 
one focusing specifically on environmental disclosure (as in Blacconiere and Patten 1994, Patten 
and Nance 1998, and Heflin and Wallace 2017).  Similar to Michelon et al. (2019), we rely on 
searches of the Global Reporting Initiative database, CorporateRegister.com, and individual 
company websites to identify the existence of standalone CSR reporting, and we identify that 38 
 
(1989) also use a three-day window, but Kalra et al. (1993) report two-day CARs, and both Bowen et al. (1983) and 
Blacconiere and Patten (1994) use longer five-day windows. We repeat all tests using the alternative windows and 
results remain qualitatively similar to those we report using the three-day CARs.   
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sample companies had issued a 2009 or 2010 standalone CSR report.13  We use a one/zero 
indicator variable, ‘CSR Report’, to designate the report-issuing firms.   
 To identify differences in the provision of environmental information, we rely on the 
Bloomberg disclosure scores. Bloomberg reports the extensiveness of environmental reporting 
on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 percent based on the number of environmental information 
items each firm reports in various corporate documents (including stand-alone CSR reports, 
annual reports and websites) (Eccles et al. 2014).  The Bloomberg scores are being increasingly 
used in disclosure research (see, e.g., Birkey et al. 2016; Tamini and Sebastianelli 2017; 
Michelon et al. 2020). Consistent with Blacconiere and Patten (1994), Patten and Nance (1998), 
and Heflin and Wallace (2017), we focus on disclosure from the year prior to the event of 
interest, in our case, 2010, and we designate the disclosure metric as ‘Env Disc’.  Our Env Disc 
scores range from 1.38 to 73.64 with a mean of 35.33.14  
Control Variables  
We separately test the relation between the CSR reporting measures and company-
specific CARs using multiple regression analysis controlling for other factors potentially 
influencing investors’ perceptions of regulatory cost exposure.15  Because the immediate 
physical effects of the Fukushima accident are limited to Japan, we anticipate that social and 
 
13 The percentage of companies issuing standalone reports is considerably higher than for the samples examined in 
Christensen (2016), Li et al. (2017), and Du and Wu (2019).  This is likely a function of our sample companies 
being much larger, on average, than those in the other studies.  Simnett et al. (2009) document that firm size is a 
major factor explaining the choice to issue a standalone report.  They also find that utilities are one of the industry 
groups statistically more likely to issue a report, a factor also likely helping to explain our sample’s higher 
percentage of reporting.  We have no basis to expect the differing sample percentages to influence interpretation of 
our analysis. 
 
14 Both the range and mean of the scores is consistent with findings from other studies of environmental disclosure 
by companies in environmentally sensitive industries (see, e.g., Cho et al. 2012a; Clarkson et al. 2008; Dobler et al. 
2015). 
15 Controlling for other potential regulatory exposure factors is consistent with Blacconiere and Patten (1994), Patten 
and Nance (1998), Heflin and Wallace (2017), and Li et al. (2017). 
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political cost exposure would likely be more prevalent for the Japanese firms in our sample.  
Accordingly, we include a one/zero indicator variable, Japan, to designate the seven Japanese 
firms in the sample.  Next, we control for firm size.  Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that 
larger firms face greater exposures to the political process, and Patten and Nance (1998) 
document firm size effects related to market reactions to catastrophic events.  We measure firm 
size as the level of market capitalization as of 11 March 2011 and obtain this data from the 
Thomson One Banker database.  We adjust for heteroskedasticity by taking the natural log of the 
size measure.  Our Firm Size measure ranges from 19.53 to 25.08 with a mean of 23.19.16  
Finally, Bowen et al. (1983) report more negative reactions to the Three Mile Island nuclear 
disaster for firms with more than ten percent of operating capacity coming from nuclear sources.  
Accordingly, we include a one/zero indicator variable, Nuc10, to designate sample companies 
with larger nuclear reliance, that is, greater than 10 percent reliance on nuclear operations.17  
Thirty-four of the sample firms fall into this classification.  We expect market reactions to be 
negatively related to each of the control variables, and we state our primary regression model as:      
CARi =  a1 + b1Japani + b2Firm Sizei + b3Nuc10i + b4Reportingi + ei                           (1) 
where Reporting is alternately the CSR Report and Env Disc measures.  If the alternative aspects 
of CSR reporting mitigate the market reactions, we expect a positive relation between the 
respective metrics and the CARs.  As we discuss in more detail below, we also conduct a series 
of robustness tests including additional factors.  The appendix summarizes all variable 
definitions. 
 
16 In non-tabulated sensitivity tests, we alternately use the natural log of 2010 total assets and the natural log of 2010 
revenues as a firm size measure.  Results, in both cases, remain qualitatively similar to those using the market 
capitalization measure. 
17 In non-tabulated sensitivity tests, we repeat all analyses using the individual company nuclear percentages.  




 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics and frequencies for the variables used in our 
analyses.  As reported in the table, the mean three-day CAR for the sample was a minus 2.24 
percent.  This is statistically significant at p < .001, two-tailed, and the finding is consistent with 
the market reactions for utilities with nuclear power generation to the previous nuclear disasters.  
Pearson product-moment correlations, presented in Table 3, indicate that the CSR Report and 
Env Disc variables are highly correlated.  Interestingly, at the univariate level, neither is 
significantly related to the market reactions for the nuclear firms. 
---------- Tables 2 and 3 about here ---------- 
 We present the results of the regression analyses of the impact of our CSR reporting 
metrics on market reactions to the Fukushima disaster controlling for other regulatory cost 
exposure factors in Table 4.18  Column 1 reports results for the model using the presence of a 
standalone CSR report variable, while column 2 provides results for the model using the 
environmental disclosure metric.  In both estimations, each of the exposure factors, Japan, Firm 
Size, and Nuc10, is negatively signed and each is significant at the p = .05 level or better, one-
tailed.  This indicates market reactions were more negative for companies facing greater 
regulatory cost exposures.  As highlighted in Column 1, we first find that the CSR Report 
variable, although positively signed, is not statistically significant at conventional levels.  In 
contrast, and consistent with the prior studies of environmental disclosure impacts on market 
reactions, our Env Disc metric is positively signed and statistically significant (at p < .05, one-
tailed) (see column 2 of Table 3).19  Overall, the results of our primary analyses indicate that it is 
 
18 Variance inflation factors, not reported in the table, range from 1.108 to 1.636 suggesting multi-collinearity is not 
an issue with the regression. 
19 Due to the high correlation between the separate reporting metrics (Pearson product-moment correlation = .503, p 
< .01, two-tailed), models including both measures at the same time are prone to potential multicollinearity 
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only differences in environmental information provision that appear to explain differences in the 
investor response to the Fukushima disaster.   
---------- Table 4 about here ---------- 
Robustness Tests 
 We conduct a series of additional analyses to assure the robustness of our primary results.  
First, we note that the prior studies of the mitigating impacts of environmental disclosure at times 
of catastrophic events are limited to the U.S. setting.  Because our sample of nuclear utilities is 
dominated by U.S. firms (26 of the 52 companies), it is possible that the relations we report are 
being driven by the U.S. factor.  To explore this possibility, we include a one/zero indicator 
variable (US) to designate the U.S. firms and, alternately, US*CSR Report  and US*Env Disc 
interaction variables to capture any differing relations for that sub-group of firms.  This enhanced 
model is thus stated as: 
CARi =  a1 + b1Japani + b2Firm Sizei + b3Nuc10i + b4Reportingi + b5USi +  
  b6US*Reportingi + ei                                    (2) 
 
We present the results of these additional analyses in Table 5.  As reflected in the table, in 
neither case is the US nor either of the interaction terms statistically significant.  Further, results 
on the CSR Report and Env Disc variables remain consistent with the primary tests.  These 
findings further support that only environmental disclosure appears to mitigate the investor 
concerns at the time of the Fukushima event.    
---------- Table 5 about here ---------- 
We next examine whether the documented disclosure effects are driven by the Japanese 
firms in the sample.  Non-tabulated tests indicate that those utilities had significantly higher 
 
problems.  Keeping these concerns in mind, when both metrics are included in the same estimation, Env Disc 
continues to show a positive statistically significant relation with the CARs, whereas CSR Report remains 
statistically insignificant.  These results (non-tabulated) are thus consistent with the primary analyses. 
19 
  
levels of pre-event environmental disclosures and significantly more negative market reactions to 
Fukushima relative to the other nuclear utilities.  Accordingly, we alternately include Japan*CSR 
Report and Japan*Env Disc interaction terms and re-estimate the primary regressions.  We state 
this model as: 
CARi =  a1 + b1Japani + b2Firm Sizei + b3Nuc10i + b4Reportingi + b5Japan*Reportingi + ei  
(3)          
We present these results in Table 6.  As documented in Column 1 of the table, the 
Japan*CSR Report variable is marginally significant (p < .10, one-tailed).  However, it is also 
negatively signed, suggesting the existence of a CSR report for the Japanese companies in the 
sample is associated with more negative market reactions than is the case for other firms with 
standalone reports.  This fails to support the claims for reporting as argued by Christensen 
(2016), Li et al. (2017), and Du and Wu (2019).  Further, the CSR Report variable remains 
insignificant overall in this further analysis.  In contrast, the mitigating effect of environmental 
disclosure continues to hold in the presence of the Japan*Env Disc interaction variable (see 
Column 2), as it remains positively signed and statistically significant (at p < .05, one-tailed).  
Finally, results indicate no significant difference in environmental disclosure impacts across 
Japanese sample firms as the Japan*Env Disc variable is not statistically significant. 
---------- Table 6 about here ---------- 
 Lastly, we run a series of tests including controls for a variety of other factors.  We first 
estimate models including financial performance (ROA) and leverage (Lev) metrics as firm 
financial characteristics could potentially lead to variations in market returns (Grewal et al., 
2019).  We use fiscal year 2010 data to calculate these measures.  We then control for 
differences in the business culture at the country level.  Simnett et al. (2009, 944) argue that in 
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shareholder-oriented countries, “companies are primarily seen as instruments for the creation of 
shareholder value,” and that other stakeholder groups are less likely to be able to influence 
corporate activities.  As such, investors may consider social pressure to be less of a factor in such 
countries potentially reducing the market effects of social and political cost-inducing events.  
Following Simnett et al. (2009), we classify common law countries as being more shareholder-
oriented, and we run models including a one/zero indicator variable designating the 31 
observations in the nuclear sample originating from common law countries as an additional 
control.  Finally, we examine whether the choice to respond to Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) 
solicitations influence the market reactions.  A review of CDP data indicates that 49 of the 52 
sample companies were solicited for response by the organization in 2010, with 39 of those 
providing a response.  We use a one/zero indicator variable to designate those responders (and 
exclude the three non-contacted firms).   
 Table 7 provides the results of our final sets of robustness tests with models including the 
presence of a CSR report summarized in Panel A, and those using environmental disclosure in 
Panel B.  As reflected in the table, the only additional control exhibiting statistical significance is 
leverage.  It is positively signed and statistically significant in the models for each of the CSR 
disclosure metrics.  More importantly, the relations for the two disclosure metrics remain 
consistent with the primary results in all additional estimations.  Env Disc continues to be 
positively related to market reactions, although in the model controlling for CDP response the 
significance level is slightly reduced.   In no estimations is the CSR Report variable statistically 
significant.  Results thus continue to suggest that it is only environmental disclosure that serves 





 Our study is motivated by the concern that studies examining the impact of CSR 
reporting without considering differences in the nature and extent of information provided may 
lead to incorrect inferences about the impact of CSR disclosure.  To illustrate this potential 
problem, we investigate whether the mere presence of a standalone CSR report plays the same 
mitigating role as environmental disclosure on market reactions to events increasing the social 
and political exposure of affected firms.  We explore this issue relative to the 2011 Fukushima 
nuclear disaster in Japan.  Our results document differing effects across the two reporting 
measures.  Based on a sample of 52 international utility companies with nuclear power 
generating capacity and controlling for other factors potentially influencing regulatory cost 
exposure, we document a positive and significant association between levels of pre-event 
environmental disclosure and market reactions.  In contrast, our results also show that the mere 
presence of a standalone CSR report did not similarly reduce market effects for the sample 
companies.  If only the latter reporting metric had been used, the results would suggest CSR 
disclosure had no impact in the situation examined, when the results on environmental disclosure 
show that was not the case.  And while both Christensen (2016) and Du and Wu (2019) report 
less negative market reactions to misconduct of an environmental nature in the presence of a 
CSR report, our results suggest the results may instead be a function of differences in overall 
environmental information associated with those firms.  Overall, our results suggest that in 
examining the impacts of corporate social responsibility reporting, a careful assessment of the 
nature and extent of the information being provided appears to be warranted.    
Like all studies, ours is subject to limitations.  We explore an event that is, arguably, 
environmental in nature, and similar to the prior studies of such catastrophes, we focus on an 
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industry that is commonly considered to be sensitive to environmental exposures.  As such, we 
cannot assess whether the presence of a standalone CSR report is sufficient to mitigate market 
impacts for events of a non-environmental nature, or make inferences regarding whether the 
positive associations reported by Christensen (2016) for those types of events are potentially also 
driven by differences in other types of CSR information.  Extensions along these lines of 
research would clearly add to our understanding of the impacts of corporate social reporting, and 
could add further support for the need to carefully consider both the nature and the extent of CSR 
disclosure when assessing its potential impacts, particularly given substantial evidence that both 
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Figure 1: Timeline of events following the earthquake and tsunami on 11 March 2011 
 
    
 Date Events  
    
 11 March 2011 
t = 0 
Earthquake off of North Japan’s coast at 2:46 pm (JST). 
Fukushima nuclear power plant shuts down. 
Tsunami approximately an hour afterwards. 
Fukushima nuclear power plant swept by tsunami. 
Failure of cooling system. 
Radiation levels 1,000 times normal. 
Japanese government declares state of emergency at a reactor of 
Fukushima nuclear power plant because of the possibility of radiation 
leak. 
Evacuation of 2,800 residents. 
 
 12 March 2011 
 
TEPCO reports failure of cooling system in a second reactor. 
Japanese government declares state of emergency at a second reactor of 
Fukushima nuclear power plant. 
Comparison to Three Mile Island and Chernobyl incidents.  
Explosion at Fukushima. 
20km evacuation radius. 
 
 13 March 2011 
 
Attempt to cool down reactors in Fukushima 1 using seawater. 
Evacuation of over 200,000 residents. 
 
 14 March 2011 
t = 1 
Second explosion at Fukushima.  
Drop in water levels in all three reactors in Fukushima 1. 
Danger of meltdown.  
 
 15 March 2011 
t = 2 
Third explosion at Fukushima. 
TEPCO admits possibility of partial meltdown. 
Fire breaks out at Fukushima. 
Staff evacuated from plant; only 50-70 workers left. 
Evacuation radius extended to 30km.  
 





 Table 1 – Sample distribution by country. 
 
     
 Country # of Firms % of Sample  
     
 Brazil 1 1.9%  
 Czech Republic 1 1.9%  
 Finland 1 1.9%  
 France 1 1.9%  
 Germany 3 5.8%  
 Hong Kong 1 1.9%  
 India 2 3.8%  
 Italy 1 1.9%  
 Japan 7 13.5%  
 Portugal 1 1.9%  
 Russia 1 1.9%  
 South Korea 1 1.9%  
 Spain 3 5.8%  
 Switzerland 1 1.9%  
 United Kingdom 1 1.9%  
 United States 26 50.0%  










Table 2 – Descriptive statistics and frequencies for variables examining disclosure effects on 
the market reaction for nuclear utility companies to the Fukushima disaster (n = 52).  
 
           
   Descriptive Statistics  
           
 Variable   Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std. Dev.  
           
 CAR  -0.0796  0.0576  -0.0224a  0.0292  
           
 Env Disc  1.38  73.64  35.33  20.75  
           
 Firm Size  19.53  25.08  23.19  1.05  
           
   Frequencies  
           
 Variable  Number of  
Observations 
 Percentage  
of Sample 
 
           
 CSR Report  38  73.1%  
           
 Japan   7  13.5%  
           
 Nuc10  34  65.4%  
       
 
a  Significant at p < .001, two-tailed. 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 






Table 3 – Pearson product-moment correlations (n = 52).   
 
              




 Japan  Firm 
Size 
 Nuc10  
              
 CAR 1  -.133  -.108  -.410  -.349  -.385  
              
 Env Disc   1  .503  .288  .488  .117  
              
 CSR Report     1  -.142  .531  .105  
              
 Japan       1  -.080  .287  
              
 Firm Size         1  .098  
              
 Nuc10           1  
              
 Significance at p < .05, two-tailed indicated in bold. 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
       




Table 4 – Regression analysis of impact of pre-event CSR disclosure on the market reaction 
(3-day CARs) to the Fukushima event for utilities with nuclear power generation (n = 52).  
 
     
  (1) (2)  
     













     





     





     
 Env Disc .001 
(1.940)** 
  
     
 CSR Report  .005 
(0.566) 
 
     
 Adj. R2 .366 .320  
     
 We report t-statistics in parentheses below parameter estimates. 
**, *** indicate significance at .05 and .01 levels, respectively. 
See Appendix for variable definitions.  






Table 5 – Regression analyses of the market reaction (3-day CARs) to the Fukushima event 
for utilities with nuclear power generation (n = 52) controlling for potentially differing 
effects for U.S. utilities.  
 
     
  (1) (2)  
     













     





     





     
 Env Disc .001 
(2.021)** 
  
     
 CSR Report  .002 
(0.135) 
 








     





     
 US*CSR Rpt  .006 
(0.368) 
 
     
 Adj. R2 .351 .292  
     
 We report t-statistics in parentheses below parameter estimates. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 






Table 6 – Regression analyses of the market reaction (3-day CARs) to the Fukushima event 
for utilities with nuclear power generation (n = 52) controlling for potentially differing 
effects for Japanese utilities.  
 
     
  (1) (2)  
















     















     





     





     





     
 Japan*CSR Rpt  -.036 
(-1.798)* 
 
     
 Adj. R2 .363 .351  
     
 We report t-statistics in parentheses below parameter estimates. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 













Table 7 – Regression analyses of the market reaction (3-day CARs) to the Fukushima 
event for utilities with nuclear power generation (n = 52) controlling for other potential 
factors.  
 
      
 Panel A – CSR Report   
      
  (1) (2) (3)  




















      



















      







      
 ROA .063 
(0.452) 
   





   
      
 Common Law  .001 
(0.111) 
  
      
 CDP   .015 
(1.430) 
 
      
 n 52 52 49  
      
 Adj. R2 .395 .306 .305  
      
 We report t-statistics in parentheses below parameter estimates. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 








Table 7 – Regression analyses of the market reaction (3-day CARs) to the Fukushima 
event for utilities with nuclear power generation (n = 52) controlling for other potential 
factors.  
 
      
 Panel B – Environmental Disclosures   
      
  (1) (2) (3)  




















      



















      







      
 ROA .077 
(0.575) 
   





   
      
 Common Law  .008 
(0.904) 
  
      
 CDP   .009 
(0.989) 
 
      
 n 52 52 49  
      
 Adj. R2 .439 .364 .336  
      
 We report t-statistics in parentheses below parameter estimates. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. 
See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 





 Appendix – Variable definitions.  
 
     
 Variable  Definition  
     
 CAR  The three-day cumulative abnormal return for each sample company 
commencing on the day of the Fukushima disaster (11 March 2011). 
 
     
 Env Disc  The 2010 environmental disclosure score for each sample company as reported in 
the Bloomberg ESG database. 
 
     
 CSR 
Report  
 A one/zero indicator variable designating sample utility companies having issued 
a 2009 or 2010 standalone CSR report. 
 
     
 Japan  A one/zero indicator variable designating sample utility companies 
headquartered in Japan. 
 
     
 Firm Size  The natural log of each sample company’s market value of equity as of 11 March 
2011 as reported in the Thomas One Banker database. 
 
     
 Nuc10  A one/zero indicator variable designating sample utility companies with ten 
percent or more of capacity generated by nuclear power plants. 
 
     
 US  A one/zero indicator variable designating sample utility companies 
headquartered in the United States. 
 
     
 ROA  Each sample utility company’s fiscal year 2010 reported net income divided by 
beginning of the year total assets. 
 
     
 LEV  Each sample utility company’s 2010 total long-term debt divided by 2010 total 
assets. 
 
     
 Common 
Law 
 A one/zero indicator variable designating sample utility companies 
headquartered in a common law country. 
 
     
 CDP  A one/zero indicator variable designating sample utility companies providing a 
response to the CDP request in 2010. 
 
     
 
 
 
 
